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IN
THE SUPREME COURT

OF
THE STATE OF UTAH

GEORGE M. MECHAM,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

Case No. 14084

vs .
GAIL T. MECHAM,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE

This is an action for divorce wherein PlaintiffRespondent, hereinafter "plaintiff,ff averred mental cruelty
as grounds and sought custody of the parties 1 minor child.
Defendant-Appellant, hereinafter "defendant,f! counter-claimed
for divorce upon grounds of mental cruelty, for custody of the
parties 1 minor child, alimony, child support, and for division
of the parties' personal property in accordance with the
stipulation of the parties dated June 4, 1974.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT

The lower court granted plaintiff and defendant a
decree of divorce one from the other on the grounds of mental
cruelty; awarded custody of the minor child to plaintiff
subject to review after the expiration of one year from
date of entry of the decree, and awarded defendant one dollar
a year alimony.

Defendant's Alternative Motion for New

Trial or Amendment of the Decree was denied April 15, 1975.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Plaintiff seeks affirmation of the lower court's
award of custody to plaintiff.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The evidence adduced at trial November 29, 1974y
December 2, 3, and 4, 1974, and March 14, 1975, records:
The parties were married November 7, 1970.
10, 222, 227)

(Tr.

One child named Andrew, three years of age,

(now four) was born of the marriage on April 26, 1971.
(Tr. 10, 11, 227)
When the parties were married plaintiff was
employed as an attorney having been admitted to practice
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in this state in May, 1967.

(Tr. 10, 130) During the

majority of the courtship period, defendant was employed
as a stewardess but terminated her employment prior to
marriage*

(Tr. 9) After the parties' separation on May 24,

1974, defendant obtained employment with Mountain Bell
Telephone Company as a service representative trainee on
July 8, 1974, but according to defendant's witness, Ona Hunt,
^he was transferred to "conversion-type work11 because
11

. • .she had trouble holding up under the pressure, . .fl of

a service representative trainee.

(Tr. 10, 150) According

to defendant's counsel, defendant terminated her employment
with Mountain Bell on March 11, 1975, in anticipation of
remarriage.

(Tr. 339)

Defendant has exhibited conduct of an irrational,
unstable, self-destructive, and emotional nature. Approximately one year before the parties were married she attempted
to take her life through the ingestion of an overdose of
aspirin, for which she was hospitalized overnight at the
Latter-Day Saints Hospital.

(Tr. 12, 141, 142)

Defendant cited plaintiff's misrepresentations
about the latter's marital status prior to marriage
and drinking as factors precipitative of the attempt
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upon her life.

(Tr. 223, 225)

She testified of being aware

in January, 1970, (New Year's Day) that no action had been
taken by plaintiff to obtain a divorce.

(Tr. 223, 224)

Plaintiff testified the decree of divorce from his first
wife was granted June 23, 1970, and became final October 23,
1970.

(Tr. 200, 201)
For three months after the birth of the parties1

.child, defendant testified she suffered severe depression
caused by the death of her grandmother, hormonal changes,
and the plaintiff's drinking.

(Tr. 19)

psychiatric care for her depression.

She received

(Tr. 19)

Defendant

stated she entertains ". . .feelings of insecurity,"
caused by her background and her relationship with the
plaintiff (Tr. 21, 22), that she is prone to fits of rage
and irrational conduct evidenced by throwing objects, biting,
and beating (Tr. 20, 268, 270), breaking furniture and
dishes (Tr. 270), and using abusive language•

(Tr. 179)

She also stated that the use of alcohol causes her to lose
proper perspective and abandon responsibilities as witnessed
by automobile accidents (Tr. 296, 297), refusal to leave
social functions at reasonable hours, (Tr. 300-302), "skinny
dipping" (Tr. 300), and loss of consciousness.
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(Tr. 296)

On August 6, 1974, defendant again attempted to
take her life in the presence of plaintiff and the minor
child after the child stated:
Daddy.11

(Tr. 140)

?f

No, I want to stay with you,

On that occasion, she administered a

potentially lethal overdose of Valium for which she was
hospitalized at the University Hospital until the afternoon
of the following day.

(Tr. 140, 181)

Plaintiff testified he

$nd his son drove to the defendant's apartment after a birthday celebration to return the child to defendant at about
8:45 p.m., on the evening of August 6, 1974, that defendant
was not at her apartment, that plaintiff then drove to the
location of one Michael W. Turpin's apartment with whom
defendant had been romantically involved since May 3, 1974,
that a discussion ensued between the defendant and the child
out of earshot of the plaintiff in which the child apparently
indicated he wanted to stay with his father, that defendant
became emotional and distraught whereupon she stated, "You
poisoned your son's mind against me,11 (Tr. 139), that
defendant, upon arrival at her apartment, announced in the
presence of her son. . . "Okay, Ifm going to call my attorney
and you can have Andrew, (Tr. 140), all I want to do is get
this thing ended. . .," that defendant who admitted she had
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consumed "several drinks and I just lost control,!! (Tr. 126),
thereafter administered an overdose of Valium, which caused
loss of consciousness.

(Tr. 138-141)

Plaintiff and the

child rushed her to the University Hospital. (Tr.

138-141)

Besides the immediate events of August 6, 1974, defendant
and her counsel cited events which occurred in May and June,
1974, as being factors which contributed to her second
-attempted suicide.

(Tr. 126, 250-252)

On May 3, 1974, while the plaintiff and defendant
were living together as husband and wife, defendant met
Michael Wo Turpin with whom she became immediately romantically and sexually involved.

(Tr. 24-26)

Defendant testified

she spent the Memorial Day weekend between May 24 and May 27,
1974, with Mr. Turpin at his cabin located at Holliday Park,
Utah, wherein she engaged in illicit sexual relations believing plaintiff and the minor child to be in St. George, Utah,
with plaintiff's parents.

(Tr. 27, 28) Although defendant

denied to plaintiff any extramarital involvement with
Mr. Turpin or anyone else prior to her sojourn in Holliday
Park (Tr. 130, 131, 132), she admitted at trial that she and
Mr. Turpin had intimate sexual contact on several occasions
between May 13th and 17th, 1974.
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(Tr. 25, 26) Additionally,

defendant testified as to a night spent with the husband
of a "friend11 while the latter's wife was out of town a
year before the parties1 separation; although any impropriety
on her part was denied.

(Tr. 118, 119)

Both parties expressed their love and affection
for the minor child.

(Tr. 28, 30, 144)

Defendant testified

that the child ". . .was very close to his father, he loved
his father, too. . .", that she felt plaintiff

lf

. . .was a

good father to Andrew. . .", and that ". . . he (Andrew) is
possibly the only human being that George has ever loved.!f
(Tr. 141)

Defendant's witnesses who were acquainted with

the plaintiff and had observed him with the child both before
and after the parties' separation, described the relationship
between plaintiff and the minor child as "congenial" and
"very loving."

(Tr. 193, 198)

Between June and August defendant left the child
in the care of babysitters on many occasions to be with
Mr. Turpin.

(Tr. 37-42)

Frequently she did not return to

the child on such occasions until early morning.

(Tr. 37-42)

Defendant, on the evening of June 6, 1974, aroused the child
from his bed at approximately 10 o'clock p.m., packed him
in her car, and traveled to Mr. Turpin's cabin arriving
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around midnight, whereupon she spent the night.
35)

(Tr. 34,

She also testified that having the child under her

care would have interferred with her sexual, but not
romantic, involvement with Mr. Turpin.

(Tr. 32).

Plaintiff testified that the child lived with him
after August 6, 1974, until the time of trial (Tr. 135),
that he enrolled the child in nursery school two mornings
a week (Tuesday and Thursday) as planned prior to separation
(Tr. 144), that plaintiff's mother cared for the child during
hours he spent at work after which he cared for the child,
(Tr. 144), that in the four months prior to trial he had
left the child with a babysitter on only one occasion (Tr. 146),
that he envisioned his role as a parent as that of "provider,"
"teacher,11 and "friend," and that he felt he was performing
these roles adequately for the child.

(Tr. 143)

Defendant also testified she had no family or
relatives living in Utah.

(Tr. 9)
ISSUES

The exclusive issue for determination by this Court
is whether the lower court abused its discretion or acted
unreasonably in awarding custody of the minor child to the
plaintiff.
s
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ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING
CUSTODY OF THE MINOR CHILD TO THE PLAINTIFF.
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that the
welfare and best interests of minor children constitutes
the primary concern and guiding principle in the award of
children caught in the turbulance of divorce.
This Court in Sampsell v. Holt, 115 Utah 73,
202 P. 2d 550 (1949), declared:
"Child custody proceedings are equitable
in the highest decree, and this court has
consistently held that the best interests
and welfare of the minor child is the
controlling factor in every case.11
The declaration of Sampsell

supra, has been oft

repeated as being of paramount importance.

Steiger v.

Steiger, 4 Utah 2d 273, 293 P. 2d 418 (1956); Johnson v.
Johnson; 7 Utah 2d 263, 323 P. 2d 16 (1958); Hyde v. Hyde,
22 Utah 2d 429, 454 P. 2d 884 (1969); Arends v. Arends,
30 Utah 2d 328, 517 P. 2d 1019 (1974) .
It is no less settled that the trial courtfs
decision as to child custody will not be disturbed unless
it is clear that a breach of discretion occurred at the lower
level.

Graziano v. Graziano, 7 Utah 2d 187, 321 P. 2d 931

(1958); Sartain v. Sartain, 15 Utah 2d 198, 389 P. 2d 1023
(1964).

The reason given for the "infallibility" rule is

that the trial court is in an advantaged position to observe
the demeanor of the witnesses and form opinions. As stated
in Sampsell supra, at 115 Utah 80:
"The trial judge had the opportunity, as we
do not, of seeing the parties and the witnesses,
of observing their demeanor, and of forming
opinions."
Perhaps more apposite to the case at bar is the
courtfs statement in Hyde supra,, where in it states at 454 P.
2d 885:
"The trial lasted several days, and since
both parties testified in open court and
were present during the taking of the
testimony of other witnesses, the trial
judge was in a much better position to
determine the question of fitness of the
parties to have custody than are we who
are limited to the reading of the record.
He had the advantage of observing the
behavior of the parties and could, therefore,
better judge the emotional stability of each,
than we can."

A.

A FINDING OF UNFITNESS OF THE MOTHER IS NOT NECESSARY

TO SUSTAIN AN AWARD OF CUSTODY IN THE FATHER.
In the case of Walton v. Koffman et ux., 110 Utah 1,
169 P. 2d 97 (1946), which involved a custody contest: between

-10-

the mother of the children and the childrenfs grandparents
this court reversed an award of custody of the plaintiff
(mother) even though it found the plaintiff morally fit and
able to support them.
The court in Sampsell supra, in affirmance of an
award of partial custody to the father upon a finding that
it was in the best interest of the child held that plaintiff
^as not entitled, as a matter of law to custody of a minor
child under Section 40-3-10, U.C.A. (1943), merely because
there was no showing that she was an improper person.
More recently in Hyde supra, this court sustained
the award of a two-year-old minor daughter to her father despite insistance by the defendant that a mother's right to
custody of small children should not be denied, unless it
is shown

ff

. . .that she is such an immoral, incompetent, or

otherwise improper person that it would be contrary to the
child's best interests. . .,f to award her custody.

The

court looked to evidence of the defendant's emotional condition
as justification for the trial court's belief that the
condition of the defendant could deteriorate under stress
and strain, even though it did not find her an unfit or
improper person.

(Emphasis added.)
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Also, in the case of Lantis v. Lantis, 86 Nev. 885,
478 P. 2d 163 (1970), which involved an appeal from an order
changing custody from the mother to the father, the Nevada
Supreme Court held it unnecessary for the mother to be found
unfit to justify a change of custody previously awarded.
The Nevada court recited the concern of the lower court at
478 P. 2d 165:
..4

."I think the big issue that confronts us
here is not so much whether Debbie Lantis is
fit and proper and a decent person and so
forth, but rather whether she is mature enough
and responsible enough to undertake all of
the duties of the mother and take care of this
little girl. Frankly that's the way I see it,
and this is what makes it hard. * * * I don't
think Debbie is a terrible person by any
means. I don't approve of some of her conduct.
I'm old-fashioned, too, and I don't approve
of it for one minute. The conduct itself
doesn't necessarily in my opinion mak£ her
unfit, unsuitable, or anything else, but it
does indicate something to me, and it indicates
a lack of responsibility toward this little
girl.* * *"
The evidence now before this court clearly demon-

strates the immature and unstable nature of the defendant.
She has attempted suicide on two different occasions for
which she was hospitalized and she suffered from severe
depression after the birth of the minor child for a period
of three months,

(Tr. 12, 19, 21, 22, 140)
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Defendant attempted to show that her inclination
towards self-destruction before the parties were married in
November, 1970, was provoked, and perhaps even justified,
by plaintiff's misrepresentations concerning his marital
status and by the use of alcohol during their courtship.
(Tr. 223, 225)

Yet, it appears from defendant's own testimony

that the events claimed as precipitious of the first suicide
^occurred several months after the suicide attempt.

She

testified she met with the plaintiff and his former wife
on New Year's Day 1970, and shortly thereafter, learned
divorce proceedings by the plaintiff's former wife had not
been commenced.

(Tr. 224)

She further testified to the best

of her recollection that the first attempted suicide occurred
a year before marriage.

If such is the case, it would have

occurred in October or November, 1969; months before the
complained events. One can only speculate why defendant
consented to marry plaintiff if their pre-marital association
was so unsettled and excruciatingly painful as to cause
defendant to attempt suicide.
Dr. Tedrow testified many reasons exist in explanation of suicide, but that usually people who are not crazy
or schizophrenic, who attempt suicide, are of a depressive
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nature.

(Tr. 91)

Such persons, he stated, are usually

wholly dependent upon other persons,

(Tr. 91)

Dr. Tedrow's characterization of the depressive
as being dependent upon other persons tends in some measure
to explain why the defendant became so totally involved
with Mr. Turpin after their May meeting.
Defendant and her counsel cited the stress and
strain of the events of May 27 through June 3, 1974, as the
cause of defendant's second suicide attempt in August.
(Tr. 102)

Dr. Tedrow on redirect examination testified,

however, that a casual connection between stress and strain
occuring two months before the actual attempt did not stack
up very well.

(Tr. 113)

Cause and effect is usually a matter

of hours or a few days, he stated.

(Tr. 114)

The more logical explanation for the second suicide
seems to be that when the minor child verbalized a preference
for the plaintiff, the defendant felt totally rejected
by the child and that all was lost.

(Tr. 140)

While Dr. Nielson testified that in his opinion
the defendant's suicide gestures would not detract from her
ability to meet the minor child's needs (Tr. 52), Dr. Ferre
expressed some concern about how the defendant had coped with
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stress and difficult situations in the past.

(Tr. 332)

He indicated he could not predict with any certainty what
her capacity to deal with stress and difficult situations
would hold in the future. (Tr. 332) He also testified
that defendant's deep involvement with Mr. Turpin showed
poor judgment in his opinion.

(Tr. 332)

Defendant urges reversal by this court based upon
.the conclusions of Drs. Nielson and Ferre that defendant is
the "psychological-" parent. Yet, both doctors testified that
in their view plaintiff was a fit parent; and able to fulfill
the needs of the minor child.

(Tr. 51, 333)

Both testified

the child was remarkably free from symptoms usually found in
a child whose parents were separated.

(Tr. 51, 60, 330, 328)

Dr. Ferre further testified he felt the plaintiff's mother
(child's grandmother) had a ". . .good relationship with the
boy. . .," that she was providing adequately for him, and
seemed very concerned.

(Tr. 329) Nor did Dr. Ferre see

any problems related to the plaintiff's mother caring for the
minor child during the day.

(Tr. 330)

At the conclusion of the trial the court expressed
grave concern that neither Dr. Nielson nor Ferre

had dealt

at any length with the manifest emotional instability of the
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defendant witnessed by periods of "depression and the
association with Mr. Turpin."
ff

A

Yes, I read this and he finally said there
is some -- the report here, I am most concerned
for the child. Very frankly most concerned.
The reasons were explained, yes, about Mrs.
Mecham!s emotional problems which resulted in
some attempts at self-destruction, whether
they were successful or not, nobody has said
much about these in this reports and I am very
distressed. And by distressed not at her, what
gives me problems in this is the emotional
/instability, the fact that during this matter
her association with Mr. Turpin under the
circumstances caused me substantial questions
in this matter/' (Tr. 338, 339)
If it is in error for the trial court to refuse to

substitute the judgment of medical experts for its own
informed judgment, after hearing the evidence and observing
the demeanor of the parties, then, perhaps, it is time that
decisions concerning the welfare and placement of children
in divorce actions be removed from the area of judicial
determination.
B.

PLAINTIFF HAS EXHIBITED LOVE AND AFFECTION FOR THE MINOR

CHILD, WILL HAVE THE ASSISTANCE OF OTHERS WHO LOVE AND CARE
FOR THE CHILD TO ASSIST IN THE CARE OF THE CHILD, AND MAINTAINS
THE CONTINUITY OF PHYSICAL AND SOCIAL CONTACTS AND ENVIRONMENT
SO VITAL TO A CHILD'S WELFARE
-16-

The lower court determined both parties were fit
and proper parents.

(Tr. 344)

But, upon balance, it

found plaintiff could more adequately meet the child's
needs.

Defendant failed to sustain the burden of proof

imposed by the parties' stipulation on each party; that is,
f!

which party can best care for the interests and welfare

of said child."

(R. 20)

The award of custody to plaintiff based upon the
interests and welfare of the child is substantiated by the
record.

Plaintiff testified he provided for the child's

physical and emotional needs and otherwise performed functions
normally characterized as maternal.

(Tr. 142, 143)

Defendant

also witnessed the performance of "fatherly11 functions by
plaintiff.

(Tr. 270) No testimony was introduced to

contradict plaintiff's conclusion that the minor child was
receiving a balance of maternal and paternal attentions
equivalent to those received prior to the parties' separation.
No evidence was introduced to show plaintiff's
care of the child was other than proper, or that the child
was adversely affected by being in plaintiff's care. While
Drs . Nielson and Ferre agreed that defendant was the
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"Psychological" parent and therefore, preferable
(Tr. 52, 334), both agreed plaintiff was a fit parent
capable of adequately meeting the child's needs.
330)

(Tr. 51,

Both were impressed by the child's remarkable freedom

from symptoms normally associated with marital difficulties
and with the child's above-average adjustment to his new
situation.
.* ••.-..'-..

(Tr. 51, 330)

/While Dr. Ferre expressed concern over what he

characterized as the "vindictiveness and hostility" of the
plaintiff toward the defendant, he stated that he could find
no evidence that the child was being affected by such
sentiments.

(Tr. 328)

To the contrary, he concluded the

child had made an unusually fine adjustment.

(Tr. 330)

Dr. Tedrow found plaintiff possessed of qualities befitting
a good parent.

(Tr. 90)

With regard to the ability of which party could
best provide for the care of the child, evidence established
that since the separation, the welfare of the child has
been plaintiff's paramount concern.

The child was enrolled

in the same pre-school nursery as contemplated by the
parties before separation.

(Tr. 144)

This, as opposed to

defendant's withdrawal of the child's application from
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the school because her employment schedule precluded time
off to deliver or pick up the child.

(Tr. 18)

Dr. Nielson

believed the nursery school was the most stable environment
in the childfs life at the time of his evaluation, and that
it should be preserved at all cost.

(Tr. 72)

Additionally, plaintiff spent his time during the
evenings, weekends and holidays exclusively with the child,
save one evening outing to a football game.

(Tr. 146)

In contrast, during the two months defendant had the care of
the child, he was often left with babysitters until the early
hours of the morning (Tr. 34, 37-42), on one occasion aroused
him from his sleep at approximately 10:00 p.m., so that she
could spend the weekend with Mr. Turpin at the latter !s
cabin (Tr. 34), and defendant manifested such poor judgment
and lack of concern for the child's sensibilities as to
attempt to take her life in the presence of the child.
(Tr. 30, 139, 140, 256)

The impact of that night still

lingers.
It is significant defendant made no attempt to
gain custody of the child during the four months prior to
trial. Her desire to not make a "football" out of the child,
(Tr. 257), while laudible, contravenes a more apparent
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reason.

Defendant testified that Mr. Turpin slept at

her apartment when the child was not present and that while
custody of the child would not have interferred with her
romantic involvement, it would have interferred with her
sexual involvement with Mr. Turpin.

(Tr. 32)

Both Drs. Nielson and Ferre expressed the
importance of stability and consistency in the child's life.
(Tr. 66, .336) Custody in the plaintiff provides such
stability and consistency.

The child lives in the home

where he has lived since infancy.

(Tr . 136)

He maintains

friendships with neighborhood children with whom* he is
comfortable and familiar.

(Tr. 145)

He attends church.

He has a daily lifestyle similar to that enjoyed before the
parties' separation.

In most instances, the child follows

the same secure patterns of life established for him before
May, 1974, which have enabled him to adjust to a

potentially

chaotic situation with remarkable ease.
Dr. Nielson testified that a child often reflects
the attitudes, prejudices and vices of a parent.

(Tr. 73)

fl

I think the relationship that a child has with his parents

will have a lot to do with how he relates to his own
children,ff the doctor stated.

(Tr. 84)
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Defendant admitted

she shelters feelings of insecurity fostered by her childhood experiences,

(Tr. 21, 22) Defendant's insecurity is

a problem for real concern as witnessed by prolonged depression
after the birth of the parties' child

(Tr. 19), and two

attempted suicides (Tr • 12, 140) which Dr. Tedrow stated
were demonstrative of "the ultimate in depression/'

(Tr. 91)

No evidence was adduced to demonstrate that the plaintiff
,1s insecure or is subject to periods of emotional instability.
While defendant cites the use of alcohol, foul
language, and misrepresentations as evidence of the plaintiff's
instability, the record bespeaks defendant's use of alcohol,
foul language, violence and misrepresentations, if such is
the measure, of emotional instability.

Given plaintiff's

imperfections, no evidence was produced to show any actual
or imagined detriment to the child as a result of plaintiff's
actions.

Dr. Ferre testified that plaintiff's solutions,

while perhaps not the best solutions, "showed he was an
intelligent and refined person.11

(Tr. 331)

On the other

hand, the defendant's attempted suicide in the presence of
the parties1 minor child undoubtedly has been indelibly
impressed upon the child.
Both parties admittedly are concerned for the
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welfare of the child.

Both parties love the child.

But
. i

beyond that is the question as to which party can best
i

provide for the child's needs. Defendant offers love and

I

care (Tr. 28), while plaintiff offers that together with

I

the realization that responsibilities are incumbent upon a

i
parent.

Plaintiff recognizes that he must provide, teach,

befriend, and discipline the child.

(Tr. 143)

In this

I

regard, plaintiff is assisted during the hours he is employed
by the child's paternal grandmother.
In the case at bar the lower court penalized
neither party.
(Tr. 344)

I

B

I

It found both parties fit and proper.

-

It expressed concern about the emotional instability

of the defendant and concern too, about her judgment.

It's

concern was justified as evidenced by an attempted suicide

I
|

before marriage, a period of three months despondency following
the child's birth, another attempted suicide in the presence

|

of the child, inability to cope with stress and strain in an

•

employment situation, and a relationship with Mr. Turpin
which Dr. Ferre and the Court described as showing "poor

I

judgment."

I

i
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..I

SUMMARY
It is respectfully submitted that the child custody
award of the lower court should be affirmed.
Placement of the child with the plaintiff has had
the least detrimental effect upon the child.

The child

lives both in a physical and social environment where he
feels comfortable and secure. The environment he has known
since infancy.
Plaintiff has shown himself to be responsible and
more than capable of caring for the child's wants and needs.
The child has made a better than average adjustment to his
new situation.

He enjoys a sense of permanency, a sense

fostered by his having been with the plaintiff for more than
a year now, a sense which should never again be disrupted.

•SaTTTake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Plaintiff and
Respondent
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